Trade Name Protection: Relaxation of the “Secondary Meaning” Requirement and Its Implications by unknown
TRADE NAME PROTECTION: RELAXATION OF THE
"SECONDARY MEANING" REQUIREMENT AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
T wE recent case of Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Restaurant
Corp.' illustrates the legal risks one takes in choosing a business
name. The defendant, owner of a Brooklyn restaurant, was enjoined
from any further use of the name "Wolfies," the trade name of the
plaintiffs' two "well-known" Miami, Florida, restaurants.2 On appeal
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, one judge dissent-
ing, holding that the evidence supported an inference that "Wolfies"
meant the Florida restaurants even to Brooklyn residents, i.e., that the
name had a "second meaning."3 The court went on to hold, however,
that the injunction should be affirmed, even absent any finding of
"secondary meaning," because of the defendant's "intent" to trade on
the plaintiffs' reputation and name by representing that he was associated
with the plaintiffs' restaurants.4 The dissent objected to the minimal
1291 F.zd 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889 (i96i).
8 F. Supp. 454 (E.D.N.Y. 196o). The court held that the defendant's adoption
of the name was not "a purely fortuitous thing," but was informed and deliberate.
Id. at 456. He had actual knowledge of the Miami restaurants before choosing the
name and had disregarded a desist notice. Prior to this civil action the plaintiffs were
denied relief under N.Y. PEN. LAW § 964.
a 291 F.2d at 3o3. The trial court's failure to make an express finding of "second-
ary meaning" and the "likelihood of confusion" was not reversible error, because the
appellate court could infer from the evidence, including statistics on the seasonal migra-
tion between Brooklyn and Miami, gross business, and gratuitous remarks about the
Miami restaurants on nation-wide television, that these restaurants had acquired
"secondary meaning." See also Premier-Pabst Corp. v. The Elm City Brewing Co., 9
F. Supp. 754, 760 (D. Conn. 1935) (Hincks, J.). But see John Morrell & Co. v.
Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d 314, 317 ( 7 th Cir. xg6i) (trial court's failure to find
"secondary meaning" must be construed as finding it does not exist).
"The reasons for choosing the name, such as the fact that the secretary of the
corporation was known as a "wolf" in his younger days, and the reasons for using
"Wolfies Floridan Style French Toast" as a menu item, and reproducing in substantial
form the arrangement of the plaintiff's menu were found to be "specious." Suspicion
was increased by the use of a disclaimer, printed in red 3A6" high letters inside the
menu. 185 F. Supp. at 457. Since the trial court found all this specifically, Judge
Hincks saw no distinction between this conduct and ordinary "palming off" in a products
case. 292 F.2d at 303.
Palming off involves both deceit of the public and the misappropriation of the
name, reputation or business good will of another, Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425,
155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996-(1956),
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evidence demanded of the plaintiffs- and to the granting of a "name
monopoly"' to a "not too unique nickname" primarily on the basis of its
"flagrant appropriation.' rt
The purpose of trade name protection, especially in non-competitive
situations, is to prevent injury to the reputation of an established con-
cern. 8 Such an injury can arise when a presumably inferior concern,"
and is usually associated with a competitive relationship, involving actual trade di-
version. Ball v. United Artists Corp., 13 App. Div. ad 133, 2x4- N.Y.S.2d z29, 2z5
(196i); 3 RESTATEMENT, To TS § 7xo (1938). But where a person holds out his
business as a branch of or as sponsored by another with a better reputation, there is
"palming off" in a broad sense. Stork Restaurant Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 9o, 94
(E.D. Pa. i94i).
5 "A trade name implies trade. If trade is not affected, there is no loss, no chance
of deflection ... there is no proof or even claim that plaintiffs' name, credit, reputa-
tion for quality, or kindred assets are being tarnished by the defendant." 291 F.2d at
304. But see Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Marcus, supra note 4; 2 NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION AND TRADE-MARKS § 91 (4th ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as NIMs].
' This fear seems exaggerated, however, since the acquisition of a "name monopoly"
depends on the law of each forum. California courts, for instance, have become more
conservative since the famous case of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.zd 348
(gth Cir. 1948), relied on by the majority in Wolfies. See Miles Laboratories, Inc. v.
Frolich, x95 F. Supp. 256, 258-59 (S.D. Cal. 5961).
'The dissent distinguished those cases involving better-known concerns from the
present one: "It may well be that a 'Stork Club' or a 'Pump Room' should qualify
for exclusionary protection as against an ordinary citizen named 'Joe' but quare
whether a restaurant operator using a soubriquet in its familiar or diminutive form
'Wolfie' can in this day and age claim such uniqueness. . . ." as to acquire a non-
statutory monopoly without legislative sanction. 2gx F.2d at 305. Compare McCoy
v. McCoy, 98 N.E.zd 435, 438-39 (Ohio C.P. 1951) ("Real McCoy"); Esquire, Inc.
v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d 540, 54-5 (st Cir. 1957) ("Esquire"). Judge
Moore's position in Wolfies has been criticized. See Derenberg, Fourteenth Year of
Trademark ict of z946, 51 TRADEMARK REP. 777, 825-26 (1961).
o Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches,
Inc., 2%1 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 35o U.S. 832 (x955); General Adjust-
ment Bureau, Inc. v. Fuess, 197 F. Supp. 542, 546 (S.D. Tex. 196i).
'See Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. Pa. 1941) ; 3
RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 712(g) (1938). It is not necessary that the defendant's
services be inferior. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Roberston, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
They may even be of superior quality. Budget System, Inc. v. Budget Loan and
Finance Plan, x2 Utah 2d 18, 361 P.2d 512 (1961). This presumption is logical,
however, if harm to the plaintiff, rather than to the public, is the basis of relief.
Developnents in the Law-Trade Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARY. L. R-v.
S14, 891 (.955).
Practically speaking, however, the courts are ill-equipped to judge relative qualities.
See, e.g., Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N.Y. Supp.
176, 179 (Sup. Ct. 937). Therefore, once the first user's rights have been established
it is presumed that a confusionof source will be injurious. Ibid. But see Avon Shoe
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which may be many miles away or producing entirely different goods,
imitates the name of a well-known concern and tarnishes its repututation
by creating an unfavorable association between the two concerns.3
But before protection is granted, before another's use of a similar1'
or identical 12 trade name is denied or restricted, the established concern
usually must show that its name has acquired a special, source-identifying
quality in its business use. 3 Once this quality is established, 4 so is the
Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909
(i96o).
1" Stern, Buyer Indifference and Secondary Meaning in Unfair Competition and
Trademark Cases, 32 CONN. B.J. 381, 387-92 (1958).
"'See, e.g., Horlick's Malted Milk Corp. v. Horluck's, Inc., 59 F.2d 13 (gth Cir.
1932) ; Monroe Stationers & Printers, Inc. v. Munroe Stationers, Inc., 332 Mass. 278,
124 N.E.2d 526 (1955) J. B. Liebman & Co. v. Leibman, 135 N.J. Eq. 288, 38 A.2d
187 0944).
1"See, e.g., Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U.S. 461 (-914)5
Howards Clothes, Inc. v. Howard Clothes Corp., 236 Minn. 291, 52 N.W.2d 753
(1952).
"5See Younker v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 176 N.E.2d 465, 467 (Ohio C. P.
1961). See also Pike, Personal Names as Trade Symbols, 3 Mo. L. REV. 93, 105
(1938); DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 325-27
(1936) [hereinafter cited as DERENBERG].
A person has a right to use his own name, but he must use it honestly to prevent
confusion with an established trader whose name has acquired secondary meaning. i
NIMS § 67. Even if he uses it in good faith, however, he may be required to sub-
ordinate its use or use a distinguishing legend. J. A. Dougherty's Sons, Inc. v.
Dougherty, 36 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Pa. i94o).
Protection extends as far as the name is understood in its "secondary" sense and to
any locality where it can be shown to be injuring the plaintiff. Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (i916). Therefore, a larger area of protection will
be granted where the traveling public has carried the plaintiff's reputation to far-distant
points and where his business attracts customers from a large area. Quality Courts
United, Inc. v. Quality Courts, Inc., 14o F. Supp. 341, 349 (M.D. Pa. 1956).
Under such conditions, the real, immediate beneficiaries of an injunction are usually
the establishments competing with the defendant, who have lost custom by improper
use of a trade-attracting name. Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 892 n.565
(955). Oates has speculated that the "vitally interested, actual competitors of the
defendant may be the complainants of the future, and, without resort to the Federal
Trade Commission, they may acquire in their own right relief against traders who
compete with them by the unfair use of a third party's name." Oates, Relief in
Equity Against Unfair Trade Practices on Non-Competitors, 25 ILL. L. REV. 643, 671
(931).
" The plaintiff has the burden of proving that his name has acquired special
significance in the trade and that the defendant is using it unfairly to his and the
public's detriment. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS §§ 773,
77.4(a) (Id ed. 195o) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANN]. Length of use, the nature
and extent of advertising, and other promotional efforts are all considered. Sun Valley
Mfg. Co. v. Sun Valley Togs, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Note, 62 W. VA.
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likelihood of confusion, the primary legal issue and the supposed cause
of the injury." The trade name will then be endowed by the courts
with a qualified "property" interest 6 and given the same sort of
protection as a common law, distinctive trademark.17
Although this "property" concept has expanded, covering larger
areas of business interests,"8 the likelihood of injury to the plaintiffs'
business reputation would seem analytically dependent on a finding of
"secondary meaning.""9 The Wolfies decision, however, protected the
L. REV. z54 (196o). But no presumption of "secondary meaning" can be made where
the name or device is neither fanciful nor used so long, extensively and exclusively so
that association with the user would naturally result. z NIMS 1o39, 1078.
15 Secondary meaning is a prerequisite to source confusion. Ball v. United Artists
Corp., x3 App. Div. zd 133, 214 N.Y.S.2d 21g, 27 (196i); Home of the Week,
Inc. v. Associated Press, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 460, 465 (D.R.I. z959). Without its
showing, there is no likelihood of injury to the plaintiff's reputation resulting from
confusion as to the identity or sponsorship of the second business. See, e.g., American-
Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 196o) ; Joshua Meir Co. v. Albany
Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.zd 1474 (2d Cir. 1956). But compare Lincoln Restaurant
Corp. v. Wolfies Rest. Corp., 291 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889
(196i).
1 The trade name is a "property right" to the extent that one's trade, free from un-
warranted interference by others, is protected. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)5 Budget System, Inc. v. Budget Loan and Finance Plan,
12 Utah 2d AS, 361 P.2d 512-(1961).
1" See, e.g., Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 197 F. Supp.
524, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 296!). In both cases the aim is to protect the honest trader, punish
the dishonest, protect the public from deception and sometimes protect the competitors
of the imitator. DERFNBERE 52-53.
"8See cases cited note 27 infra; 3 CALLMANN §§ 60-62; Comment, 70 YALE L.J.
406, 416-x8 (1961).
1" If "secondary meaning" is lacking, it is illogical to say that the Brooklyn College
students across the street were motivated by a belief that the defendant's restaurant was
associated with the plaintiffs'. Familiarity with a convenient restaurant, its commenda-
tion by others, or its own quality of food, and not the name "Wolfes," could have
been the reason for the patronage. Compare J. R. Wood & Sons, Inc. v. Reese Jewelry
Corp., 278 F.2d 157 (zd Cir. ig6o) (no goodwill involved in brand name, because
it plays insignificant part in purchase of ring) ; Schwartz v. Hampton, 30 Misc.2d 837,
219 N.Y.S.zd io6 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (purchaser of record is more interested in peformer
than record company).
Compare prerequisites to protection under "anti-dilution" statutes. N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 368(c)3 (now § 3 68-d, as amended by L. 1961, c. 583, eff. Sept. 1, 1961,
granting protection to non-registrants and service marks); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. z io,
§ 7A (1954)5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (1955). Secondary meaning has been
held to be necessary to acquire "a distinctive quality," a prerequisite to protection,
although relief will be granted "notwithstanding the absence of competition between
the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services., See Dawn
Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. x959); Vacheron &
Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 155 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y.
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plaintiffs' trade name without requiring a finding of "secondary mean-
ing." The court was more concerned with the nature of the defendant's
unjustified conduct than with analytical symmetry."
The court's sensitive concern and condemning reaction to the de-
fendant's conduct was nevertheless compatible with the "equitable"
nature of trade name cases. 21 The typical fact situation in these cases
may support a variety of inferences and resulting rationales, giving
judges and litigants much semantic flexibility.22 Furthermore, each case
must be evaluated on its individual merits.3 If evidence of "secondary
meaning" is weak, its presence uncertain, a litigant can still turn to other
elements in his effort to either swing or strengthen the equitable balance
in his favor.
One of these "equitable" elements is the seemingly unjustified con-
duct of the imitator.24  However, the cases which have emphasized this
1957), rev'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. x958) ; Food Fair Stores, Inc.
v. Food Fair, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 44S (D. Mass. 1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 177 (ist Cir.
1949) i John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 314 (7th Cir. x961).
'o Compare Hat Corp. of America v. D. L. Davis Corp., 4 F. Supp. 613 (D. Conn.
1933)
, with Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.ad 607 (zd Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960) (Hincks, J.).
J judges will construe the law to uphold honesty and fair dealing. See, e.g., Radio
Shack Corp. v. Radio Shack, Inc., 18o F.2d 2oo, 2o6 (7th Cir. 195o); Vaudable v.
Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2Ad 757, 193 N.Y.S.zd 332, 335 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
" The law of unfair competition is now a broad and flexible doctrine adaptable to
changing conditions. Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443, 451 (Sup.
Ct. 1956); Liddy, Preparing and Presenting the Defendant's Case in Trademark
Litigation, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 1422, 1423 (1955).
"Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Frolich, 195 F. Supp. 256, 258 (S.D. Cal. g6i).
"The good or bad faith of the alleged infringer is particularly important when
the territorial extent of protection is in issue. If he acts in bad faith, the inference
may be made that there are prospective purchasers to be deceived. 3 RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 733 (1938).
The unsatisfactory reasons for choosing the particular name are usually of some
importance. See, e.g., Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 317 Ill.
App. 451, 46 N.E.ad 165 (943); 51 West Fifty-First Corp. v. Roland, 139 N.J. Eq.
156, 5o A.2d 369 (1946). Conversely, good reasons may infer good faith. E.g., Fair-
way Foods, Inc. v. Fairway Markets, Inc., 227 F.2d 193 ( 9 th Cir. 1955); G. B.
Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. P. Lorillard Co., 514 F. Supp. 62I (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 21o F.2d 953 (ad Cir. 1954).
The degree of similarity and "dress-up" of the establishments is also significant in
determining bad faith. Compare Brass Rail, Inc. v. Ye Brass Rail, Inc., 43 F. Supp.
671 (D. Mass. 1938) and White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle System of Eating
Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1937), with Faciane v. Starner, 230 F.2d 732
(sth Cir. 5956) and El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, xo F. Supp. 64o (N.D. Tex.
1953), re'vd on other grounds, 214. F.ad 721 (sth Cir. x954).
A facile inference of bad faith can be moderated, however, by a more exacting
Vol. 1962.: 307]
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element have usually involved, unlike the Wolfies case, a competitive
situation where there was either actual trade diversion, 5 a showing of
actual confusion,26 or the misappropriation of another's creative, un-
patented work product as one's own 7  In those cases based on non-
competitive situations, 28 the plaintiff was usually required to show a like-
"likelihood of confusin" rule. A higher degree of care on the part of the consumer,
varying directly with the nature and price of the goods, would then require a greater
degree of colorable imitation to be unlawfully confusing. Developments it; the Law,
supra note 9, at 862-63. The most recent statement of the New York standard is
that "the law does not justify interference on behalf of ignorant or careless persons.
It must be assumed that the public will use reasonable intelligence and discrimination."
Dell Publishing Co. v. Stanley. Publications, Inc., 9 N.Y.ad 26, 134, 172 N.E.2d
656, 661, 211 N.Y.S.ad 393, 400 (1961). Compare Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chese-
brough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.ad 755, 762 (2d Cir. 196o) and Stork Restaurant, Inc. v.
Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 359 ( 9th Cir. 1948) (the law protects the careless, ignorant,
inexperienced and gullible), vwoth General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Fuess, 192 F.
Supp. 542 (S.D. Tex. 1961) i Yale University v. Benneson, 147 Conn. 254, 159 A.ad
169 (i96o) Rosso & Mastracco, Inc. v. Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., 200 Va.
159, 104 S.E.ad 776 (1958) (confusion of the reasonably careful purchaser).
"Trade diversion may result from "palming off" of goods, see, e.g., Blisscraft v.
United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694 (ad Cir. 1961) i National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223
F.ad 195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (19ss), or services as those of another.
See, e.g., North American Air Coach Systems, Inc. v. North American Aviation, Inc.,
'231 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 920 (1956); Dollar Dept.
Stores, Inc. v. Laub, 238 Miss. 708, 120 So. 2d 139 (1960) ; note 4 supra. But see
Best & Co. v. Miller, 167 F.2d 374 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 88 (1948) ; 880
Stores, Inc. v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 809 (Ore. 196i).
" See, e.g., Artype, Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695 (ad Cir. 1956) ; Nagrom Corp.
v. Cock 'N Bull, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1957). But see cases in which relief
was granted despite actual confusion. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d
607 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (196o) (good faith; better known than plain-
tiff) i Schwartz v. Slenderella Systems, Inc., 43 Cal. 2d 107, 271 P.ad 857 (1954)
(carelessness).
'See, e.g., International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (19%8);
authorities cited note is supra.
Many cases granting relief have involved a breach of some contractual or fiduciary
relation. Noma Lites, Inc. v. Lawn Spray, Inc., 13o F. Supp. 124 (E.D.N.Y. i955) ,
aff'd per curiam, 222 F.2d 716 (ad Cir. x955) (confidential business secrets abused
when defendant copied advertising and packaging techniques); Gliffcorn Answering
Service, Inc. v. Deutschel, 23 Misc. 2d 254, 198 N.Y.S.ad 952 (Sup. Ct. 196o)(vendor of answering service enjoined from further use of old customer list) ; Metro-
politan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recording Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d
483 (Sup. Ct. 195o), aff'd per curiam, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.ad 795 (1951)
(recording of opera radio performances and making records from them infringed
contract rights with third party). But see Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., ii App.
Div. 2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.ad 632 (196o), aff'd, xo N.Y.ad 972, i8o N.E.ad 248, 224
N.Y.S.2d 662 (ig6i) (no property in Glenn Miller "sound," hence no breach of implied
negative covenant not to compete with'royalty-yielding licensee).
2" Competition is no longer required to state a cause of action in most jurisdictions,
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lihood of future conflict from normal business expansion, 29 the use of a
unique name,80 or the use of an ordinary name that had acquired almost
nationwide recognition as a result of long use and quality service.31 No
such requirements were imposed in Wolfies. Instead, the majority
classified the defendant's conduct as predatory, unfair commercial be-
havior, recognized by some courts as constituting an exception to the
"secondary meaning" requirement3 2  But in those cases an immediate
because legal injury includes both harm to reputation and trade. See, e.g., Greyhound
Corp. v. Greyhound Securities, Inc., 26 Misc. ad 303, 207 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct.
196o). But see White v. White, 68 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 1953); McKay v. Legler, 36
So. ad 793 (Miss. 1948) 5 Smart Shop v. Colbert's, 250 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951).
"See, e.g., Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "i6" Shop, Inc., 15 F.ad 92o (8th Cir.
1926)i Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Suburban Foods, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va.
1955). Compare Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d
Cir. 1959); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Square Deal Market Co., 2o6 F.2d 482 (D.C.
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 937 (z954) Peter Pan Restaurants, Inc. v. Peter
Pan Diner, Inc., so F. Supp. 534 (D.R.I. 1957) i Kafafian v. Spotless Stores, Inc., xji
N.J. Eq. 305, 57 A.ad 18 (1948).
0 See, e.g., Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 ( 9 th Cir. 1948) i Hanson
v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
855 (1948) ("Seventeen") ; Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407
(2d Cir. 1917) ("Aunt Jemima").
"1 See, e.g., Brooks Bros. v. Brook's Clothing, 6o F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Cal. 1945),
aff'd per curiam, 158 F.2d 798 ( 9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 824 (1947) (New
York concern prevents use of name in California); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway
Properties, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (real estate concern enjoined from
using "Safeway," tradename of grocery chain that has own property division and whose
competitor has a subsidiary called "Food Fair Properties") ; HMH Pub. Co. v. Playboy
Records, Inc., x6x F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1958) (record manufacturer enjoined from
using "Playboy")5 Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Metropolitan Artists, Inc., 27
Misc. 2d 572, 212 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mnem., 23 App. Div. ad 480, 214
N.Y.S.2d 648 (1g96) (Latin Quarter cafe and sextette enjoined from using "Metro-
politan").
t the recognized leading case for this exception is Santa's Workshop v. Sterling,
282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1953), aff'd as -odified, 2 App. Div. 2d z62,
153 N.Y.S.ad 839 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 757, 143 N.E.2d 529, 163 N.Y.S.2d 986
(1957), in which a competing animal farm owner in the same region as the plaintiff
was enjoined from imitating special designs, cut-outs, and advertising developed around
"Santa Claus," a legendary and historical figure to which the plaintiff had no exclusive
right. Although relying mainly on the "misappropriation doctrine" of International
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), the court also found a "mis-
representation," a "passing off" of a business as that of another. It has been argued,
however, that this case could have been decided according to a rapid acquisition of
"secondary meaning." Speedry Products, Inc. v. Dri Mark Products, Inc., 271 F.2d
646, 650 (2d Cir. 1959). But in any event the Santa case involved such an obvious
theft of a business idea that the fraudulent nature of the defendant's conduct was
apparent. Ibid.
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type of competitive business injury, lacking in Wolfies, had been
present;33 insistence on "secondary meaning" would have denied or at
least delayed protection from definite harm.34
When "secondary meaning" is required, however, it affords most
competing enterprises indulging in "product differentiation" through
non-functional designs, 5 selling seasonal items,3" or operating with
limited advertising budgets, 7 little protection from a quick-acting
imitator.3 The traditional position, represented by the dissent in
"Compare cases denying relief even without need to show "secondary meaning."
Speedry Products, Inc. v. Dri Mark Products, supra note 32 (functional pen design
copied); Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.
1956).
It is inaccurate to say, however, that New York no longer requires proof of
"secondary meaning." See Travel Magazine, Inc. v. Travel Digest, Inc., x91 F. Supp.
830 (SD.N.Y. 1g6) ; Dell Publishing Co. v. Stanley Publications, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d xa6,
172 N.E.zd 656, 211 N.Y.S.2d 393 (x961); Schwartz v. Hampton, 30 Misc.2d 837,
219 N.Y.S.zd 1o6 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Rather, the law is not limited to the requirement,
American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.zd 287, 290 (2d Cir. 196o), nor is it
always a prerequisite to relief, Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug Co., 271
F.2d 569 (zd Cir. 1959), cert. deenied, 362 U.S. 919 (196o).
"' This is true because of the traditional proof requirements of long and exclusive
use of a personal name, descriptive word or non-functional design before "secondary
meaning" is usually established. See notes 14 supra, 42 infra.
"SSee, e.g., American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 196o)
(slots in mop-presser plate). Protection id confined to non-functional, i.e., ornamental
or distinctive features. One may freely imitate an unpatented article in all of its
functional elements, i.e., those which permit successful operation of the article and reduce
its manufacturing cost. No "secondary meaningl attaches to functional features.
3 CALLMANN § 77.4(e) 5, at 1253-54.
38 See, e.g., Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp.
577 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (chocolate Santa Claus and sleigh).
37Although "big" concerns have no certainty that advertising will imprint their
trade name in the public's mind so that "secondary meaning" is rapidly acquired, the
"smalP business often is unable to finance such an effort. It must rely on the good
faith of its competitors if it takes a chance and chooses a personal name, descriptive
word, or non-functional design to distinguish its products. For this reason a relaxa-
don of the "secondary meaning" requirement may be desirable. Compare Catalina, Inc.
v. Ganis, 207 Misc. io68, 142 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (relief given, recognizing
limited promotion but likelihood of injury).
Compare note 54 infra, discussing the suggested fact-finding improvements that can
be made in unfair competition cases. While such improvements enhance objectivity, they
nevertheless impose greater expenses on one who asserts his rights to exclusive use of
a trade name.
See Derenberg & Baum, Trade Regulation, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 440, 463-67 (196i);
Galbally, Unfair Trade it; the Simulation of Rival Goods-The Test of Commercial
Necessity, 3 VIi-L. L. REV. 333 (1958); Pollack, Unfair Trading By Product Simula-
tion, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 74 (1962) ; Note, 41 B.U.L. REV. 538 (x961).
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Wolfes,89 is to deny relief to the prior user of a non-functional design40
or color,41 as well as personal names, unless a source-identifying quality
has been acquired at the time of the imitation 42  This effort takes time
and expense with no certainty of success.
To remedy this uncertainty and facilitate protection, some com-
mentators have suggested modifications of the "secondary meaning"
requirement.43  The absence of "commercial necessity" for using an
intruding trade symbol4 or the recognition of an "about-to-be-acquired
secondary meaning" 45 have been proposed as ways to protect a prior
user of a trade name without an express finding of "secondary mean-
ing."46  Unlawful intent, deemed important in the Wolfies case, and
even good faith would become immaterial, however, if either standard
were adopted, just as bad faith can be immaterial once "secondary
89 295 F.2d at 305.
"American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 196o).
"Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug Co., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 99 (i96o) (contended, however, that pink color may be func-
tional).
'Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
Accord, Polaroid Corp. v. Polarod Electronics Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y.
x96o), aff'd, 287 F.zd 492 (2d Cir. x961) i Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 126 F.
Supp. 737 (D. Conn. 19.54), modified, 224 F.2d ioo (2d Cir. z955).
"0 See Galbally, supra note 38, who says the law has failed to keep up with marketing
developments by failing to protect the "personality" of a goods' fanciful features against
the commercial free-rider. Garner also urges the courts to recognize the real function of
trade names as one of "display." Then all the evidence problems in "secondary mean-
ing" litigation would be solved. Once a term is displayed in a trademark way, it can
be presumed to have public acceptance at once. The primary meaning would exist side
by side with the trade meaning; the former need not be submerged by long and intensive
use before the latter can exist. Garner, A Display Theory of Trademarks, 25 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 53 (1956). But see Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUTi. L. REv. 809, 814-17 (1935), criticizing the assumption that
there is an unlimited supply of equally attractive words under which any commodity
can be sold, so that the second seller is at no commercial disadvantage if he is forced
to avoid words chosen by the first.
"Today it is primarily used as a test of illegal intent. 3 CALLMANN § 85. (c),
at 1676-77; 2 NiMs § 366g, at 1153. See Blisscraft v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d
694, 702 (2d Cir. 1961); Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Frederick Ungar Publishing
Co., 197 F. Supp. 524, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
This test seems particularly a propos to the use of corporate names which can be
selected arbitrarily. See 3 CALLMANN § 85.2(a), at 168; 4 CALLMANN § 89.2(b) ; I
Nnms §§ 81b, 91-2.
453 CALLMANN § 77.4(e) (2), at 1261-62.
"o This would be consistent with an older, now minority rule that made imitation
illegal if merely the similarity of the designs was likely to deceive consumers. See
generally 3 CALLMANN § 77.4(e) (2), at 1259-6o; Galbally, supra note 38.
DUKE LA.W JOURN.4L [Vol. 1962: 307
meaning" is definitely established. 47  The controlling considerations
would then seem to be the cost of changing a trade name or symbol
relative to any potential loss to the plaintiff's business interests48 and the
breadth of the judicial imagination seeking feasible alternatives.
The "economic realities" and apparent simplicity of such standards
seem attractive, but they must be balanced against their effect on the
procedural and proof requirements in trade name cases. Under the
"commercial necessity" test, for example, a mere showing of imitation
in an area frequented by some of the prior user's customers would seem
to establish a prima fade case or a presumption of unjustified imitation
for trade purposes.49 The second user would then have the burden of
convincing the trier of facts that he had no unlawful intent, 0 or that
no other name was reasonably as suitable as the one he now uses. Un-
der the "about-to-be-acquired secondary meaning" standard, a presump-
tion of injury to a business reputation through an erroneous association
between two concerns would be established without proof that it has or
ever will acquire that source-identifying interest that is supposedly in
danger and entitled to legal protection."' Serious consideration should
T See note 13 supra; 3 CALLMANN § 77.1, at 1228. But see CALLMANN § 7 7 . 4 (d),
at 1252.
"'Such reasoning has been 'used, as dictum, after the plaintiff had established
"secondary meaning." See, e.g., Ambassaor East v. Shelton Corners, Inc., 12o F.
Supp. 551, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n of Chicago, 81 F. Supp. 127, 133 (N.D. Ill. 1948); Sullivan v. Ed Sullivan
Radio & T.V., Inc., i App. Div. ad 609, 152 N.Y.S.zd 227 (1956).
' Under present law, however, mere imitation without proof of "secondary
meaning"is not enough to shift the burden of justification to the defendant. Norwich
Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug Co., 271 F.2d 569, 573 (Id Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. gig (596o). Imitation without more is permissible regardless of the fact
that the courts have little sympathy for a wilful imitator. American Safety Table
Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 9s5 (i959).
But see Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches,
Inc., 221 F.zd 4.64, 467 n.6 (2d Cir. s955), reversing, x19 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
"This would assume, however, that good faith and ignorance of prior use would
still be valid defenses. Under existing procedure the burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff, although defendant's counsel would try to rebut any inference of
unlawful intent which ihe plaintiff's evidence tended to show. Under the alternative
approach a burden of dissuasion would seem to control and be placed on the defendant.
" Unless the plaintiff can show that his business interest comes within an expanding
category of protectable interests, supra note 8, the only other interest recognized under
the common law is that of source identity and the reputation attached to it. A court
may also hesitate to either indulge in speculation or place itself in an analytical
dilemma. See note 15 supra.
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be given to these implications before the "secondary meaning" require-
ment is either relaxed or discarded.52
Those who favor relaxation of the "secondary meaning" requirement
apparently view the judicial function as one of establishing rules of
fair business conduct and discouraging unjustified imitation in order to
prevent any form of unjust enrichment." In fulfilling this function,
however, the court would act as a regulator of the market place, guided
by its own notions of commercial fair play and necessity. The "second-
ary meaning" requirement, on the other hand, does give some definite,
predictable "due process" guidance to judges and litigants.54 They
know in advance how the conflicting claims to the use of a trade name
will be settled.55 A relaxation of the "secondary meaning" requirement
in order to reach an acceptable result and advocate higher standards
of business conduct may fail to respect the analytical and procedural
foundations that support the protection of trade names, especially under
non-competitive conditions. The legal risks in choosing a business name
-8 If the Wolfies majority had either dismissed for failure to show "secondary
meaning" or decided for itself that it had been established, future litigants would not
run the risk of relying on this case and having their action dismissed for failure to
satisfy their burden of showing "secondary meaning," especially if they have no sub-
stantial evidence of bad faith or competitive, predatory conduct. For an analogous
experience see Family Doctor Plan v. Group Health Ins., Inc., 148 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup.
Ct. x956), distinguishing the Santa case, 3 N.Y.ad 757, 143 N.E.2d 529, 163 N.Y.S.2d
986 (1957), as involving the imitation of a "unique design" and other figures and not
the use of a descriptive word, such as "Family Doctor."
"' See authorities cited note 21 supra. But see Galbally, supra note 38, at 342,
stating that "when courts abandon known rules in favor of vague and subjective stand-
ards of ethics and morality, the practice of law becomes hazardous. Judges become as
unpredictable as juries. Business decisions, however, must be predicated on the reason-
able predictability of legal consequences."
"' Adherence to a generally accepted manner of procedure is desirable to limit the
area of uncertainty. Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Cheseborough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d
755, 762 (2d Cir. x96o) (dissenting opinion). Therefore, instead of relaxing or
replacing the "secondary meaning" test, its weaknesses could be cured by adopting more
objective methods of measurement. Oppenheim, The Judicial Process in Unfair Compe-
titlon LaW, 2 PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
xi6, 130 (1958 Supp.). Opinion polls and surveys have been suggested. See, e.g.,
Caughey, The Use of Public Polls, Surveys and Sampling as Evidence in Litigation, and
Particularly Trademark and Unfair Competition Cases, 44. CALIF. L. RF.v. 539 (1956) 5
Pattishall, Reaction Test Evidence in Trade Identity Cases, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 145
0959).
" Without a standard other than subjective evaluation, "confusion and uncertainty
will inevitably beset businesses everywhere." It is this problem, not the preservation
of the "mQsaic of the law," that gives pause to advocates of conceptual reform. Gal-
bally, supra note 38, at 342.
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would increase further"' if not only the mature of trade name rights but
also the manner in which they are determined become even more un-
certain.
"' For comments on existing confusion, especially in the Second Circuit, see con-
curring opinion in Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538,
547 (2d Cir. 1956); Derenberg, supra note 7, at 823 (much depends on the chance
of the assignment calendar); Derenberg & Baum, supra note 38, at 467; Lunsford,
Unfair Competition: Uniform State Act Needed, 44 VA. L. REV. 583, 599 (1958).
Pattishall, an ardent proponent of "secondary meaning," says "the law of secondary
meaning is the most direct possible demonstration that what the law seeks to protect
in trade identity cases is not a particular word or device, as such, but only the identifying
function that word or device may serve . . . any other rule is plainly illogical . .. the
only logical rule is that trademarks will be protected within the scope of likelihood of
confusion.... Until we can bring the courts to discard the notion that certain kinds of
words may be protected and until we can focus their attention on the true issue before
them-is someone trading on the identity of another-we can expect to contend with
the maze of contradiction and inconsistency which has so long characterised this field of
law." Pattishall, Secondary Meaning in Trade Identity Cases; Some Questions and
Suggested Answers, 45 TRADEMARK REP. iz6x, 1z64-65 (:955).
